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Exchange Rate Risk and the Impact of Regret on Trade
Abstract This paper examines the behavior of the regret-averse multinational firm under
exchange rate uncertainty. Regret-averse preferences are characterized by a modified utility
function that includes disutility from having chosen ex-post suboptimal alternatives. We
show that the conventional results that the multinational firm optimally produces less, sells
more domestically, and export less abroad under uncertainty than under certainty holds if
the multinational firm is not too regret averse. Using a simple binary model wherein the
random spot exchange rate can take on either a low value or a high value with positive
probability, we show that the conventional results may not hold, particularly when the
multinational firm is sufficiently regret averse and the low spot exchange rate is very likely
to prevail.
Keywords Exchange rate risk · Multinational firms · Regret theory
JEL Classification D81 · F23 · F31
1 Introduction
The study of the multinational firm under exchange rate uncertainty has been the subject
of considerable research in decision making under uncertainty (Broll et al. 2009; Broll and
Wong 2006; Broll and Zilcha 1992; Fillat and Garetto 2010; Mra´zova´ and Neary 2011;
Pflu¨ger and Russek 2013; Russ 2007; Schmitz 2010; to name just a few). The extant
literature examines the production and export decisions of the multinational firm using
the standard von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility representation. It is shown that
the risk-averse multinational firm optimally produces less, sells more domestically, and
exports less abroad when the exchange rate uncertainty prevails than when the random
spot exchange rate is fixed at the expected value (say via foreign exchange forward/futures
trading).
In reality, multinational firms may have desires to avoid consequences wherein ex-post
suboptimal decisions appear to have been made even though these decisions are ex-ante
Exchange Rate Risk and the Impact of Regret on Trade 2
optimal based on the information available at that time. To account for this consideration,
Bell (1982, 1983) and Loomes and Sugden (1982) propose regret theory that defines regret
as the disutility arising from not having chosen the ex-post optimal alternative, which
is later axiomatized by Quiggin (1994) and Sugden (1993). Regret theory is supported
by a large body of experimental literature that documents regret-averse preferences among
individuals (see, e.g., Loomes, 1988; Loomes et al., 1992; Loomes and Sugden, 1987; Starmer
and Sugden, 1993). Steil (1993) conducts a survey of 26 multinational firms in the U.S.
regarding their foreign exchange risk management. Most respondents in his survey strongly
object to the hedging strategies as suggested by expected utility maximization because they
regard those strategies as ex-post suboptimal ones, which is consistent with regret theory.
The purpose of this paper is to incorporate regret theory into the model of the multina-
tional firm under exchange rate uncertainty a` la Broll and Zilcha (1992). To this end, we
characterize the multinational firm’s regret-averse preferences by a modified utility function
that includes disutility from having chosen ex-post suboptimal alternatives. The extent of
regret depends on the difference between the actual home currency profit and the maximum
home currency profit attained by making the optimal production and export decisions had
the multinational firm observed the true realization of the random spot exchange rate.1 We
are particularly interested in examining the impact of regret on the multinational firm’s
production and export decisions as compared to the benchmark case of certainty.
We show that the multinational firm optimally produces less, sells more domestically,
and exports less abroad under uncertainty than under certainty should the multinational
firm be not too regret averse. In this case, the risk-sharing motive remains first-order
important to the multinational firm. These findings suggest that it is quite possible that
the multinational firm may optimally produce more, sell less domestically, and export more
abroad under uncertainty than under certainty should the multinational firm be sufficiently
regret averse. To verify this conjecture, we develop a binary model wherein the random spot
1In our model, regret is driven by the lack of flexibility that the multinational firm can react to new
information, which is in stark contrast to the real options approach.
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exchange rate can take on either a low value or a high value with positive probability. In such
a binary framework, we show that the conventional results are violated if the multinational
firm is sufficiently regret averse and the low spot exchange rate is very likely to prevail. In
this case, the optimal levels of domestic sales and foreign exports under certainty are very
close to their counterparts that are ex-post optimal at the low spot exchange rate. The
sufficiently regret-averse multinational firm as such optimally adjusts its level of foreign
exports upward and its level of domestic sales downward so as to limit the potential regret
when the high spot exchange rate is actually revealed, thereby rendering the optimal output
level under uncertainty to exceed that under certainty.
Our novel results that regret aversion may lead to more foreign exports and less domestic
sales are likely to hold in a country having a pegged exchange rate with a small probability
that the country has to devalue its currency. In case of the unlikely event of devaluation,
multinational firms earn more on their foreign exports in domestic currency terms and thus
would have regret from the fact that they did not sell enough abroad. This suggests that
multinational firms in countries with pegged exchange rates tend to export more, other
things being equal. Indeed, Klein and Shambaugh (2006) find that pegging appears to
increase trade by up to 35%, whereas indirect pegs do not appear to have any strong
impact on trade.
This paper is closely related to the early work of Paroush and Venezia (1979) who
examine Sandmo’s (1971) model of the competitive firm under uncertainty wherein the
firm possesses a bivariate utility function defined on profits and regret. Our modified
regret-theoretical utility function is a tractable version of theirs in that the bivariate utility
function is specified as an additive separable function such that the degree of regret can be
measured by a constant coefficient.2 In contrast to Paroush and Venezia (1979), we consider
Broll and Zilcha’s (1992) model of the multinational firm that possesses market power and
sells in the home and foreign countries.3
2See Wong (2014) for an application of the modified regret-theoretical utility function in the context of
Paroush and Venezia (1979).
3Our results also apply when the firm cannot sell domestically and has to export to the foreign country
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 delineates the model of the multi-
national firm under exchange rate uncertainty (Broll and Zilcha 1992). The multinational
firm’s preferences exhibit not only risk aversion but also regret aversion. Section 3 solves
the model and provides sufficient conditions under which the behavior of the regret-averse
multinational firm is qualitatively the same as that of the risk-averse multinational firm.
Section 4 develops a binary model to show the possibility that introducing regret aversion
to the multinational firm may induce the multinational firm to optimally produce more,
sell less domestically, and export more abroad under uncertainty than under certainty. The
final section concludes.
2 The Model
Consider the multinational firm under exchange rate uncertainty a` la Broll and Zilcha
(1992). There is one period with two dates, 0 and 1. To begin, the multinational firm
produces a single commodity in the home country according to a deterministic cost function,
C(Q), where Q ≥ 0 is the output level, and C(Q) is compounded to date 1 with the
properties that C(0) = C′(0) = 0, and C′(Q) > 0 and C′′(Q) > 0 for all Q > 0.4 The
multinational firm commits to selling Q1 units of its output at home and exporting Q2
units to a foreign country, where Q1 ≥ 0, Q2 ≥ 0, and Q1 +Q2 = Q.
The multinational firm’s domestic sales generate home currency revenues at date 1
specified by a deterministic revenue function, R1(Q1), where R1(0) = 0, and R
′
1(Q1) > 0
and R′′1(Q1) < 0 for all Q1 ≥ 0. On the other hand, the multinational firm’s exports
generate foreign currency receives at date 1 specified by another deterministic revenue
function, R2(Q2), where R2(0) = 0, and R
′
2(Q1) > 0 and R
′′
2(Q2) < 0 for all Q2 ≥ 0.
only, i.e., the firm is an exporting firm.
4The strict convexity of the cost function reflects the fact that the multinational firm’s production tech-
nology exhibits decreasing returns to scale. Our qualitative results remain intact if the multinational firm
can produce the commodity in both the home and foreign countries according to the respective deterministic
cost functions.
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Due to the segmentation of the home and foreign markets, arbitrage transactions are either
impossible or unprofitable, thereby invalidating the law of one price.5
We model the exchange rate uncertainty by a random variable, S˜, that denotes the spot
exchange rate at date 1 and is expressed in units of the home currency per unit of the foreign
currency.6 S˜ is distributed according to a known cumulative distribution function, F (S),
over support [S, S], where 0 < S < S.7 The multinational firm’s home currency profit at
date 1 is given by
Π(S˜) = R1(Q1) + S˜R2(Q2)−C(Q1 +Q2). (1)
According to Paroush and Venezia (1979), the multinational firm is regret-averse if
its preferences are represented by a bivariate utility function, V (Π, D), defined on profits
and regret, where Π ≥ 0 is the multinational firm’s home currency profit at date 1, and
D = Πmax − Π ≥ 0 is the regret that is equal to the difference between the actual home
currency profit at date 1, Π, and the maximum home currency profit, Πmax, that the
multinational firm could have earned at date 1 if multinational firm had made the optimal
production and export decisions based on knowing the realized spot exchange rate. Paroush
and Venezia (1979) assume that VΠ(Π, D) > 0, VD(Π, D) < 0, VΠΠ(Π, D) < 0, VDD(Π, D) <
0, VΠΠ(Π, D)VDD(Π, D) > VΠD(Π, D)
2, and VΠΠ(Π, D) + VDD(Π, D) − 2VΠD(Π, D) < 0,
where subscripts denote partial derivatives.
For tractability, we adopt the following specification of V (Π, D) as proposed by Braun
and Muermann (2004) and Wong (2011, 2012):
V (Π, D) = U(Π)− βG(D), (2)
where U(Π) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function with U ′(Π) > 0 and U ′′(Π) < 0,
5Engel and Rogers (1996, 2001) and Parsley and Wei (1996) provide supportive evidence that arbitrage
transactions among national markets are indeed imperfect.
6Throughout the paper, random variables have a tilde (∼) while their realizations do not.
7An alternative way to model the exchange rate uncertainty is to apply the concept of information
systems that are conditional cumulative distribution functions over a set of signals imperfectly correlated
with S˜ (Broll et al., 2013).
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β > 0 is a constant regret coefficient, and G(D) is a regret function such that G(0) = 0, and
G′(D) > 0 and G′′(D) > 0 for all D ≥ 0.8 It is easily verified that all the assumptions made
by Paroush and Venezia (1979) are satisfied by the additive separable utility function given
by Eq. (2). Since Π cannot exceed Πmax, the multinational firm experiences disutility from
forgoing the possibility of undertaking the ex-post optimal production and export decisions.
To characterize the regret-averse multinational firm’s optimal production and export
decisions, we have to first determine the maximum home currency profit, Πmax, if the
multinational firm could have observed the realized spot exchange rate, S. In this case,
the optimal levels of domestic sales and foreign exports are given by Q1(S) and Q2(S),
respectively, which are the solution to the following system of equations:
R′1[Q1(S)] = C
′[Q1(S) +Q2(S)], (3)
and
SR′2[Q2(S)] = C
′[Q1(S) +Q2(S)]. (4)
Differentiating Eqs. (3) and (4) with respect to S and rearranging terms yields
Q′1(S) = −
R′2[Q2(S)]C
′′[Q1(S) +Q2(S)]
SR′′1[Q1(S)]R
′′
2[Q2(S)]− {R
′′
1[Q1(S)] + SR
′′
2[Q2(S)]}C
′′[Q(S)]
< 0, (5)
and
Q′2(S) =
R′2[Q2(S)]{C
′′[Q(S)]−R′′1[Q1(S)]}
SR′′1[Q1(S)]R
′′
2[Q2(S)]− {R
′′
1[Q1(S)] + SR
′′
2[Q2(S)]}C
′′[Q(S)]
> 0, (6)
where Q(S) = Q1(S)+Q2(S). The maximum home currency profit at date 1 as a function
of S is then given by
Πmax(S) = R1[Q1(S)] + SR2[Q2(S)]−C[Q1(S) +Q2(S)]. (7)
8Braun, and Muermann (2004) and Wong (2011, 2012) consider a regret function that depends on the
difference between the utility level of the actual home currency profit and that of the maximum home
currency profit, U(Πmax) − U(Π). Since such a specification is simply a monotonic transformation of ours,
none of the qualitative results are affected if we adopt this alternative approach (see also Wong 2014).
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Differentiating Eq. (7) with respect to S and using Eqs. (3) and (4) yields Πmax
′
(S) =
R2[Q2(S)] > 0.
We can now state the regret-averse multinational firm’s ex-ante decision problem. At
date 0, the multinational firm chooses the levels of domestic sales and foreign exports, Q1
and Q2, so as to maximize the expected value of its regret-theoretical utility function:
max
Q1≥0,Q2≥0
E{U [Π(S˜)]− βG[Πmax(S˜)− Π(S˜)]}, (8)
where Π(S˜) and Πmax(S˜) are given by Eqs. (1) and (7), respectively, and E(·) is the
expectation operator with respect to the cumulative distribution function, F (S). The first-
order conditions for program (8) are given by
R′1(Q
∗
1)−C
′(Q∗1 +Q
∗
2) = 0, (9)
and
E
{
{U ′[Π∗(S˜)] + βG′[Πmax(S˜)− Π∗(S˜)]}[S˜R′2(Q
∗
2)− C
′(Q∗1 +Q
∗
2)]
}
= 0, (10)
where an asterisk (∗) indicates an optimal level. The second-order conditions for program
(8) are satisfied given the assumed properties of U(Π), G(D), R1(Q1), R2(Q2), and C(Q).
3 Impact of Regret on Production and Export Decisions
As a benchmark, we suppose that the uncertain spot exchange rate, S˜, is fixed at its
expected value, E(S˜). In this benchmark case of certainty, Eqs. (9) and (10) reduce to
R′1(Q
◦
1)−C
′(Q◦1 +Q
◦
2) = 0, (11)
and
E(S˜)R′2(Q
◦
2)−C
′(Q◦1 +Q
◦
2) = 0, (12)
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where Q◦1 and Q
◦
2 are the optimal levels of domestic sales and foreign exports, respectively.
We are interested in comparing Q∗1 with Q
◦
1 and Q
∗
2 with Q
◦
2.
Let Q1(Q2) be the solution to R
′
1[Q1(Q2)] = C
′[Q1(Q2) +Q2]. Then, Eqs. (9) and (11)
imply that Q1(Q
∗
2) = Q
∗
1 and Q1(Q
◦
2) = Q
◦
1, respectively. Furthermore, we have
Q′1(Q2) =
C′′[Q1(Q2) +Q2]
R′′1[Q1(Q2)]−C
′′[Q1(Q2) +Q2]
< 0, (13)
since C′′(Q) > 0 and R′′1(Q1) < 0. Substituting Q1(Q2) into the objective function of
program (8) and differentiating with respect to Q2 yields
∂E{V [Π(S˜),Πmax(S˜)− Π(S˜)]}
∂Q2
∣∣∣∣
Q1=Q1(Q2)
= E
{
{U ′[Πˆ(S˜)] + βG′[Πmax(S˜)− Πˆ(S˜)]}{S˜R′2(Q2)−C
′[Q1(Q2) +Q2]}
}
, (14)
where Πˆ(S) = R1[Q1(Q2)] + SR2(Q2)− C[Q1(Q2) +Q2]. Evaluating Eq. (14) at Q2 = Q
◦
2
yields
∂E{V [Π(S˜),Πmax(S˜)− Π(S˜)]}
∂Q2
∣∣∣∣
Q1=Q
◦
1
,Q2=Q
◦
2
= E{Φ(S˜)[S˜ − E(S˜)]}R′2(Q
◦
2), (15)
where Φ(S˜) = U ′[Π◦(S˜)]+βG′[Πmax(S˜)−Π◦(S˜)], and we have used Eq. (12) and Q1(Q
◦
2) =
Q◦1. If the right-hand side of Eq. (15) is negative (positive), it follows from Eq. (9) and
the second-order conditions for program (8) that Q∗2 < (>) Q
◦
2. Eq. (13) then implies that
Q∗1 > (<) Q
◦
1. Since R
′′
1(Q1) < 0 and C
′′(Q) > 0, it follows from Eqs. (9) and (11) that
Q∗1 +Q
∗
2 < (>) Q
◦
1 +Q
◦
2.
The following proposition provides sufficient conditions under which the right-hand side
of Eq. (15) is unambiguously negative.
Proposition 1 If U ′′′(Π) ≥ 0 and G′′′(D) ≥ 0, then a sufficient condition that ensures
the regret-averse multinational firm to produce less, i.e., Q∗ < Q◦, sells more in the home
market, i.e., Q∗1 > Q
◦
2, and exports less to the foreign country, i.e., Q
∗
2 < Q
◦
2, as compared
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to the optimal levels under certainty, is that the constant regret coefficient, β, is sufficiently
small such that
β ≤
U ′{Π◦[E(S˜)]} − U ′[Π◦(S)]
G′[Πmax(S)− Π◦(S)]−G′(0)
, (16)
where Π◦(S) = R1(Q
◦
1) + SR2(Q
◦
2)− C(Q
◦
1 +Q
◦
2).
Proof We can write Eq. (15) as
∂E{V [Π(S˜)]}
∂Q2
∣∣∣∣
Q1=Q◦1 ,Q2=Q
◦
2
= E
{
{Φ(S˜)−Φ[E(S˜)]}[S˜ − E(S˜)]
}
R′2(Q
◦
2). (17)
We want to show that Φ(S) > (<) Φ[E(S˜)] for all S < (>) E(S˜) so that the right-hand side
of Eq. (17) is negative. Eq. (9) and the second-order conditions for program (8) as such
imply that Q∗2 < Q
◦
2. It then follows from Eq. (13) that Q
∗
1 > Q
◦
1. Since R
′′
1(Q1) < 0 and
C′′(Q) > 0, Eqs. (9) and (11) imply that Q∗1 +Q
∗
2 < Q
◦
1 +Q
◦
2.
Differentiating Φ(S) twice with respect to S yields
Φ′(S) = U ′′[Π◦(S)]R2(Q
◦
2) + βG
′′[Πmax(S)−Π◦(S)]{R2[Q2(S)]− R2(Q
◦
2)}, (18)
and
Φ′′(S) = U ′′′[Π◦(S)]R2(Q
◦
2)
2 + βG′′′[Πmax(S)− Π◦(S)]{R2[Q2(S)]−R2(Q
◦
2)}
2
+βG′′[Πmax(S)− Π◦(S)]R′2[Q2(S)]Q
′
2(S). (19)
Since U ′′′(Π) ≥ 0 and G′′′(D) ≥ 0, it follows from Eq. (19) that Φ′′(S) > 0 for all S ∈ [S, S].
Eq. (6) implies that Q2(S) < (>) Q
◦
2 for all S < (>) E(S˜). It then follows from Eq. (18)
that Φ′(S) < 0 for all S ≤ E(S˜) and thus Φ(S) > Φ[E(S˜)] for all S < E(S˜). Note that
Φ(S)− Φ[E(S˜)] = U ′[Π◦(S)] + βG′[Πmax(S)− Π◦(S)]− U ′{Π◦[E(S˜)]} − βG′(0). (20)
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It follows from Eq. (20) and condition (16) that Φ[E(S˜)] ≥ Φ(S). Since Π◦[E(S˜)] < Π◦(S)
and U ′′(Π) < 0, we have U ′{Π◦[E(S˜)]} > U ′[Π◦(S)]. Furthermore, Πmax(S) > Π◦(S) and
G′′(D) > 0 so that G′[Πmax(S)−Π◦(S)] > G′(0). The right-hand side of condition (16) as
such is strictly positive so that condition (16) is non-trivial. Since Φ(S) is strictly convex
in S and Φ′[E(S˜)] < 0, it follows from condition (16) that Φ(S) < Φ[E(S˜)] for all S > E(S˜).
This completes our proof. 2
The intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows. If β = 0, the multinational firm is purely
risk averse. Broll and Zilcha (1992) show that the risk-averse multinational firm produces
less than Q◦, sells more than Q◦1 domestically, and exports less than Q
◦
2 to the foreign
country so as to limit its exposure to the exchange rate uncertainty. For β sufficiently
small, introducing regret aversion to the multinational firm would not substantially change
such a risk-sharing motive, thereby rendering Q∗ < Q◦, Q∗1 > Q
◦
1, and Q
∗
2 < Q
◦
2.
4 A Binary Model
To gain more insights, we consider in this section a simple binary model such that the
random spot exchange rate, S˜, takes on the low value, S, with probability p and the high
value, S, with probability 1− p, where 0 < p < 1. In such a binary model, the right-hand
side of Eq. (15) becomes
p{U ′[Π◦(S)] + βG′[Πmax(S)− Π◦(S)]}[S − pS − (1− p)S]R′2(Q
◦
2)
+(1− p){U ′[Π◦(S)] + βG′[Πmax(S)− Π◦(S)]}[S − pS − (1− p)S]R′2(Q
◦
2)
= p(1− p)(S − S)R′2(Q
◦
2)Ψ(p), (21)
where Ψ(p) = U ′[Π◦(S)] + βG′[Πmax(S)− Π◦(S)]− U ′[Π◦(S)]− βG′[Πmax(S)− Π◦(S)]. If
right-hand side of Eq. (21) is negative (positive), i.e., Ψ(p) < (>) 0, it follows from Eq. (9)
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and the second-order conditions for program (8) that Q∗2 < (>) Q
◦
2. Eq. (13) then implies
that Q∗1 > (<) Q
◦
1. Since R
′′
1(Q1) < 0 and C
′′(Q) > 0, it follows from Eqs. (9) and (11)
that Q∗1 +Q
∗
2 < (>) Q
◦
1 +Q
◦
2.
We state and prove the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the random spot exchange rate, S˜, can take on the low value,
S, with probability p and the high value, S, with probability 1− p, where 0 < p < 1. If the
constant regret coefficient, β, is sufficiently small such that
β ≤
U ′[Πmax(S)]− U ′{R1[Q1(S)] + SR2[Q2(S)]−C[Q(S)]}
G′{Πmax(S)− R1[Q1(S)]− SR2[Q2(S)] +C[Q(S)]} −G′(0)
, (22)
the regret-averse multinational firm optimally produces less, i.e., Q∗ < Q◦, sells more in
the home market, i.e., Q∗1 > Q
◦
1, and exports less to the foreign country, i.e., Q
∗
2 < Q
◦
2, as
compared to the optimal levels under certainty. If β is sufficiently large such that condition
(22) does not hold, there exists a unique value, p∗ ∈ (0, 1), that solves Ψ(p∗) = 0, such that
Q∗ < (>) Q◦, Q∗1 > (<) Q
◦
1, and Q
∗
2 < (>) Q
◦
2, for all p < (>) p
∗.
Proof In the binary model, we can write Eq. (12) as
[pS + (1− p)S]R′2(Q
◦
2)− C
′[Q1(Q
◦
2) +Q
◦
2] = 0, (23)
since Q1(Q
◦
2) = Q
◦
1. Differentiate Eq. (23) with respect to p yields
dQ◦2
dp
=
(S − S)R′2(Q
◦
2)
[pS + (1− p)S]R′′2(Q
◦
2)− C
′′[Q1(Q
◦
2) +Q
◦
2][Q
′
1(Q
◦
2) + 1]
< 0, (24)
since R′′2(Q2) < 0, C
′′(Q) > 0, and Eq. (13) implies that Q′1(Q2) + 1 > 0. Differentiating
Ψ(p) with respect to p yields
Ψ′(p) = (S − S)R′2(Q
◦
2)
dQ◦2
dp
{pU ′′[Π◦(S)]− pβG′′[Πmax(S)− Π◦(S)]
+(1− p)U ′′[Π◦(S)]− (1− p)βG′′[Πmax(S)− Π◦(S)]} > 0, (25)
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where we have used Eqs. (11) and (23), and the inequality follows from U ′′(Π) < 0,
G′′(D) > 0, and Eq. (24). At p = 0, we have Q◦1 = Q1(S) and Q
◦
2 = Q2(S). In this case,
Π◦(S) = Πmax(S) > Πmax(S) > Π◦(S). Hence, we have
Ψ(0) = U ′[Πmax(S)]− U ′[Π◦(S)] + β{G′(0)−G′[Πmax(S)−Π◦(S)]} < 0, (26)
since U ′′(Π) < 0, G′′(D) > 0, and Πmax(S) > Πmax(S). On the other hand, at p = 1, we
have Q◦1 = Q1(S) and Q
◦
2 = Q2(S). In this case, Π
◦(S) = Πmax(S) < Π◦(S) < Πmax(S).
Hence, we have
Ψ(1) = U ′[Π◦(S)]− U ′[Πmax(S)] + β{G′[Πmax(S)−Π◦(S)]−G′(0)}. (27)
It follows from Eq. (27) and condition (22) that Ψ(1) ≤ 0. In this case, Eq. (25) implies
that Ψ(p) < 0 for all p ∈ (0, 1) so that Q∗2 < Q
◦
2. Eq. (13) then implies that Q
∗
1 > Q
◦
1. Since
R′′1(Q1) < 0 and C
′′(Q) > 0, it follows from Eqs. (9) and (11) that Q∗1 +Q
∗
2 < Q
◦
1 +Q
◦
2.
If condition (22) does not hold, we have Ψ(1) > 0. It then follows from Eq. (25) that
there exists a unique point, p∗ ∈ (0, 1), such that Ψ(p) < (>) 0 for all p < (>) p∗. Hence,
in this case, we have Q∗2 < (>) Q
◦
2, thereby Q
∗
1 > (<) Q
◦
1 and Q
∗
1 +Q
∗
2 < (>) Q
◦
1 +Q
◦
2, for
all p < (>) p∗. 2
The intuition for Proposition 2 is as follows. If condition (22) holds, the constant regret
coefficient, β, is sufficiently small so that the risk-sharing motive remains the dominant
factor in determining the multinational firm’s production and export decisions. Hence, we
have Q∗ < Q◦, Q∗1 > Q
◦
1, and Q
∗
2 < Q
◦
2, which are consistent with the results of Proposition
1. If condition (22) does not hold, β is sufficiently large so that both the risk-sharing
and regret-aversion motives have the first-order effect on the multinational firm’s behavior.
When S is very likely to be seen at date 1, Q◦2 is closer to Q2(S) and further way from
Q2(S). Introducing regret aversion, which is sufficiently severe, to the multinational firm
makes the firm take into account the substantial disutility from the large discrepancy of its
export level, Q◦2 − Q2(S), when the low spot exchange rate is revealed. To avoid regret,
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the regret-averse multinational firm optimally adjusts its export level downward from Q◦2
to move closer to Q2(S) when p is small. In this case, the regret-aversion motive reinforces
the risk-sharing motive so that Q∗1 > Q
◦
1, Q
∗
2 < Q
◦
2, and Q
∗ < Q◦. On the other hand, when
S is very likely to be seen at date 1, Q◦2 is close to Q2(S) and further way from Q2(S).
The regret-averse multinational firm as such optimally adjusts its export level upward from
Q◦2 to reduce the discrepancy of its export level, Q2(S)−Q
∗
2, when the high spot exchange
rate is revealed. In this case, the regret-aversion motive counteracts the risk-sharing motive
when p is large. Hence, there exists a critical value, p∗, such thatQ∗ < (>)Q◦, Q∗1 > (<) Q
◦
1,
and Q∗2 < (>) Q
◦
2 whenever p < (>) p
∗.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we incorporate regret theory into Broll and Zilcha’s (1982) model of the
multinational firm under exchange rate uncertainty. The multinational firm simultaneously
sells in the home market and exports to a foreign country. We characterize the multina-
tional firm’s regret-averse preferences by a modified utility function that includes disutility
from having chosen ex-post suboptimal alternatives. The extent of regret depends on the
difference between the actual home currency profit and the maximum home currency profit
attained by making the optimal production and export decisions had the multinational firm
observed the true realization of the random spot exchange rate.
We show that the conventional results of the extant literature that the multinational
firm optimally produces less, sells more domestically, and exports less abroad when the
exchange rate uncertainty prevails than when the random spot exchange rate is fixed at
the expected value should the multinational firm be not too regret averse. These findings
suggest that it is possible that the multinational firm may optimally produces more, sells
less domestically, and exports more abroad under uncertainty than under certainty. We
verify such a conjecture by using a simple binary model wherein the random spot exchange
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rate can take on either a low value or a high value with positive probability. We show that
the non-conventional results hold in the binary model if the multinational firm is sufficiently
regret averse and the low spot exchange rate is very likely to prevail. Regret aversion as
such plays a distinctive role, vis-a`-vis risk aversion, in shaping the production and export
decisions of the multinational firm under exchange rate uncertainty.
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